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INTRODUCTION 
The theme of this symposium is the relationship between 
environmental ethics and public policy. Others have discussed whether 
a unique set of ethical principles underlies environmental law, and the 
extent to which environmental ethics are explicitly referred to in judicial 
decisions or legislative debates.! This article focuses on one important 
vehicle for giving concrete content to ethical norms in the 
implementation of environmental law and policy - the movement to 
achieve environmental justice. 
As I argue below, in many ways the central premise of the 
environmental justice movement is to provide a stronger ethical 
direction for environmental law. Viewed another way, the movement 
represents an ethical challenge to the existing environmental regulation 
paradigm. 
Part I of this Article provides brief background on the environmental 
justice movement. Part 11 generally describes some of the challenges that 
environmental justice principles pose for the traditional environmental 
decision-making paradigm. Part III presents several specific examples of 
how environmental justice norms can be incorporated to improve the 
ethical outcomes of traditional agency decision making. 
I. WHAT IS ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE? 
Broadly speaking, environmental justice refers to a political and social 
movement to address the disparate distribution of environmental harms 
and benefits in our society, and to reform the processes of environmental 
decision making so that all affected communities have a right to 
meaningful participation. Its roots lie in diverse political efforts: the 
civil rights movement, organizing efforts of Native Americans and labor, 
the traditional environmental movement, and perhaps most importantly, 
the local grass roots anti-toxics movement of the 1980s. Local in origin, 
the movement grew to national prominence in the late 1980s and early 
1990s as local organizations formed regional environmental justice 
networks, the empirical evidence of environmental injustice mounted, 
and activists came together in 1991 for the First National People of Color 
Leadership Summit. 
1 Alyson Flournoy, Building an Environmental Ethic from the Ground Up, 37 U.c. DAVIS 
L. REV. 53, simultaneously published in 27 ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL'y J. 53; Christopher 
Stone, Do Morals Matter? The Influence of Ethics on Courts and Congress in Shaping U.S. 
Environmental Policies, 37 U.c. DAVIS L. REV. 13, simultaneously published in 27 ENVIRONS 
ENVTL. L. & POL'y J. 13 (2003). 
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Numerous studies show that a variety of environmental harms are 
disproportionately located in low-income communities and communities 
of color. These include hazardous waste Treatment, Storage and 
Disposal Facilities (TSDFs), air pollutants, water pollutants, air toxics, 
facilities that report under the Toxic Release Inventory (TRl) program, 
lead-based paint hazards, pesticide exposure, occupational 
environmental hazards, and others.2 Some emerging literature likewise 
has documented disparities in environmental benefits, including parks 
and open space, transportation funding, and enforcement of 
environmental laws.3 While arguments persist over whether these 
disparities are the result of racial discrimination or economic forces, race 
consistently has been shown to be a central explanatory factor (although 
not the only one). Even when controlling for political, economic, and 
other factors, studies show that race is a more important factor than 
income. The studies are generally consistent over time, whether they 
were conducted before 1992 (and thus typically analyzing just race and 
class) or since then (and thus typically employing more sophisticated 
multivariate models).4 While some commentators have suggested that 
the inequitable distribution of noxious facilities is the result of 
demographic changes that occur after unwanted land uses are sited in 
communities,S the research to date provides little empirical support for 
, See generally LUKE COLE & SHEILA FOSTER, FROM THE GROUND Ur: ENVIRONMENTAL 
RACISM AND THE RISE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT 167-183 (2000) 
(providing annotated bibliography of studies that document and describe disproportionate 
impact of environmental hazards by race and income); CLIFFORD RECHTSCHAFFEN & EILEEN 
GAUNA, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: LAW, POLICY AND REGULATION 55-76 (2002) (examining 
evidence on issue of environmental discrimination). 
3 See RECHTSCHAFFEN & GAUNA, supra note 2, at 78-85 (containing excerpts that look 
at distribution of transportation funding, open space, and access to waterfront). 
4 JAMES P. LESTER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL INJUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES: MYTHS 
AND REALmES 13-14 (2000). The authors also conducted their own very detailed study of a 
range of environmental harms at different levels of analysis: the state, county, and city 
level. The harms evaluated include air pollution (two measures), hazardous waste, solid 
waste, toxic waste, water pollution (two measures), releases of Toxic Release Inventory 
chemicals, and releases of lead. Their analysis shows a strong link between the percent 
population that is African American and the extent of environmental harms, and a 
significant, if less pronounced, link between the percent population that is Hispanic and 
environmental harms. Social class, as measured by income and education, is less 
significant than race as a predictor of where hazards are located. By contrast, the 
researchers found that higher levels of political mobilization did not lead to lower levels of 
environmental harms. [d. at 149-51. 
5 Most prominently, Professor Vicki Been suggested that the poor and racial 
minorities might move to neighborhoods that host a LULU (locally undesirable land use) 
because those neighborhoods offered the cheapest available housing, while the siting of a 
LULU may decrease the value of a neighborhood's property and the perceived quality of 
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this theory. 6 
Since the early 1990s, the environmental justice movement has 
influenced the way many policymakers, academics, regulated entities, 
affected communities, and others view environmental law and policy. In 
1994, President Clinton issued an executive order mandating that all 
federal agencies make achieving environmental justice part of their 
mission. California adopted legislation in 1999 requiring similar actions 
by state environmental agencies. Numerous other states and localities 
have adopted environmental justice policies and guidances, or have 
otherwise sought to consider environmental justice principles in carrying 
out their functions. 
What are some of the ethical norms and principles underlying the 
environmental justice movement? The broadest, most aspirational 
principles are those known as the Principles of Environmental Justice,7 
adopted collectively by several hundred activists at the First National 
People of Color Leadership Summit. Among other things, the Principles 
declare the following: 
The right of all species to be free from ecological destruction.s 
The right of environmental self-determination, and the full 
participation of all peoples at all levels of decision making.9 
life in a neighborhood, causing those who can afford to move to do so. Vicki Been, Locally 
Undesirable Land Uses in Minority Neighborhoods: Disproportionate Siting or Market Dynamics?, 
103 YALE L.J. l383, l385 (1994). 
6 In Professor Been's own nationwide study of hazardous waste facilities, for example, 
she found that neighborhoods surrounding the facilities did not become poorer or more 
heavily minority after the siting occurred there. Vicki Been & Francis Gupta, Coming to the 
Nuisance or Going to the Barrios? A Longitudinal Analysis of Environmental Justice Claims, 24 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 27-30 (1997). Another nationwide study of hazardous waste facilities 
reached similar results. See also John Michael Oakes et al., A Longitudinal Analysis of 
Environmental Equity in Communities with Hazardous Waste Facilities, 25 SOc. ScI. REs. 125, 
147 (1996) (suggesting that placement of TSDFs have not increased percentage of minority 
composition in communities surrounding them). 
7 Principles of Environmental Justice, in PROCEEDINGS: THE FIRST NATIONAL PEOPLE OF 
COLOR ENVIRONMENTAL LEADERSHIP SUMMIT xiii, xiii (Oct. 24-27, 1991). 
8 See id. ("1. Environmental justice affirms the sacredness of Mother Earth, ecological 
unity and the interdependence of all species, and the right to be free from ecological 
destruction."). 
9 See id. ("5. Environmental justice affirms the fundamental right to political, 
economic, cultural and environmental self-determination of all peoples.... 7. 
Environmental justice demands the right to participate as equal partners at every level of 
decision making including needs assessment, planning, implementation, enforcement and 
evaluation."). 
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That past and current producers of pollutants should be held strictly 
accountable for cleaning up contamination that they have caused.JO 
That principles of informed consent should be strictly enforced. ll 
The right of all workers to a safe and healthy work environment, 
without being forced to choose between an unsafe livelihood and 
12 
unemployment. 
The right to a healthy natural world for future generations, and a 
sustainable planet for humans and other living things.13 
99 
A more academic approach to understanding the ethical principles 
underlying environmental justice has been developed by Professor 
Robert Kuehn.14 In his "taxonomy of environmental justice," Professor 
Kuehn identifies four types of "justice" that are embodied in 
environmental justice: distributive justice, procedural justice, corrective 
justice, and social justice.ls 
Distributive justice refers to the equitable distribution of 
environmental burdens from risk-producing facilities and environmental 
benefits from government and private programs.16 This largely 
10 See id. ("6. Environmental justice demands the cessation of the production of all 
toxins, hazardous wastes, and radioactive materials, and that all past and current 
producers be held strictly accountable to the people for detoxification and the containment 
at the point of production."). 
II See id. at xiv ("13. Environmental justice calls for the strict enforcement of principles 
of informed consent, and a halt to the testing of experimental reproductive and medical 
procedures and vaccinations on people of color."). 
12 See id. ("8. Environmental justice affirms the right of all workers to a safe and 
healthy work environment, without being forced to choose between an unsafe livelihood 
and unemployment. It also affirIns the right of those who work at home to be free from 
environmental hazards."). 
13 See id. at xiii, xiv ("3. Environmental justice mandates the right to ethical, balanced 
and responsible uses of land and renewable resources in the interest of a sustainable planet 
for humans and other living things .... 17. Environmental justice requires that we, as 
individuals, make personal and consumer choices to consume as little of Mother Earth's 
resources and to produce as little waste as possible, and make the conscious decision to 
challenge and reprioritize our lifestyles to insure the health of the natural world for present 
and future generations."). 
14 Robert R. Kuehn, A Taxonomy of Environmental Justice, 30 ENVTL. 1. REp. 10,681 
(2000). 
15 ld. at 10,68l. 
16 Professor Shrader-Frechette argues that geographic considerations alone are "not 
morally relevant grounds for detennining who ought to receive disproportionate 
environmental impacts. . .. There is no morally relevant reason (e.g., merit, need) that 
where people live should provide sufficient grounds for discriminating against them. Such 
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geographic conception is the one that probably comes to most people's 
minds when they hear the term "environmental justice." It is a 
misconception, however, that a primary goal of the environmental justice 
movement is to geographically redistribute environmentally hazardous 
facilities. A more accurate understanding of the desire for distributive 
justice is that if the burdens of harmful land uses are more equitably 
shared, this will create greater pressure to reduce pollution throughout 
society. 
Procedural justice refers to fairness in the decision-making process, 
including the right of all members of the public to meaningful 
participation in all aspects of agency decisions.17 
Corrective justice refers to fairness in punishment, including the duty 
to compensate losses for which one is responsible, and to clean up 
contamination that one has caused. 
Social justice encompasses the idea of a more just ordering of society, 
in which all persons have their needs more fully met. In this view, 
environmental justice is part and parcel of the larger problems of racial, 
social, and economic injustice facing heavily burdened communities. 
Advocates note that the same underlying racial, political, and economic 
factors that cause disproportionate environmental harms also are 
responsible for poor housing, poor quality schools, lack of employment 
opportunities, and other problems in many communities. In tum, the 
presence of risky and undesirable land uses undermines neighborhood 
health and vitality, and leads to economic degradation. 
Policymakers and legislators have sought to capture these principles in 
specific definitions and mandates. President Clinton's Executive Order 
on Environmental Justice (Exec. Order No. 12,898) directs each federal 
agency "[t]o greatest extent practicable and permitted by law ... [to] 
make achieving environmental justice part of its mission by identifying 
and addressing, as appropriate, disproportionately high and adverse 
human health or environmental effects of its programs, policies, and 
activities on minority populations and low-income populations."ls 
discrimination instead seems to serve the interests of expediency, of using humans as means 
to some commercial or industrial end." KRISTIN SHRADER-FRECHETIE, ENVIRONMENTAL 
JUSTICE: CREATING EQUALITY, RECLAIMING DEMOCRACY 33 (2002) (emphasis in original). 
17 Professor Kaswan terms this prong of justice "political justice" because, in her view, 
the issue goes beyond the question of procedure to the substance of the deliberative 
process. That is, procedures that merely ensure the fair participation of all groups in the 
decision-making process, but that do not necessarily lead to decisions that are more 
responsive to public opinion, do not achieve what she describes as "political justice." Alice 
Kaswan, Distributive Justice and the Environment, 81 N.C. L. REv. 1031, 1045-47 (2003). 
18 Exec. Order No. 12898,59 Fed. Reg. 7,629 (Feb. 16, 1994). 
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EPA also has defined environmental justice as: 
[T]he fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all people 
regardless of race, color, national origin, or income with respect to 
the development, implementation, and enforcement of 
environmental laws, regulations, and policies. Fair treatment means 
that no group of people, including a racial, ethnic, or a 
socioeconomic group, should bear a disproportionate share of the 
negative environmental consequences resulting from industrial, 
municipal, and commercial operations or the execution of federal, 
state, local, and tribal programs and policies. Meaningful 
involvement means that: (1) potentially affected community 
residents have an appropriate opportunity to participate in 
decisions about a proposed activity that will affect their 
environment and/or health; (2) the public's contribution can 
influence the regulatory agency's decision; (3) the concerns of all 
participants involved will be considered in the decision-making 
process; and (4) the decision makers seek out and facilitate the 
involvement of those potentially affected. 19 
101 
At the state level, California has adopted legislation mandating that 
the California Environmental Protection Agency (Cal/EPA) promote the 
enforcement. of health and environmental statutes and conduct its 
programs and policies "in a manner that ensures the fair treatment of 
people of all races, cultures, and income levels."20 Cal/EPA is also 
required to develop a model environmental justice mission statement for 
its constituent departments.21 New York's environmental agency 
recently adopted a policy enhancing public participation (and other) 
requirements in the permitting process for projects in environmental 
justice areas. The policy also incorporates environmental justice 
19 See U.s. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ENVmONMENTAL JUSTICE, available at 
http:// www.epa.gov / compliance / environmentaljustice / index.html (last visited Sept. 26, 
2003). In a 2001 memo reaffirming EPA's commitment to environmental justice, EPA 
Administrator Christine Whitman elaborated that "[e]nvironmental justice is achieved 
when everyone, regardless of race, culture, or income, enjoys the same degree of protection 
from environmental and health hazards and equal access to the decision-making process to 
have a healthy environment in which to live, learn, and work." Memoranda from Christine 
Whitman on EPA's Commitment to Environmental Justice (August 9,2001) (emphasis in 
original), available at http://www.epa.gov /Compliance/resources/policies/ ej/ admin_ej 
_commiUetter_081401.pdf (last visited Sept. 26, 2003). 
'" CAL. PuB. RES. CODE § 71110(b), (c) (West 2003). 
21 [d. § 71111. The statute defines environmental justice as "the fair treatment of people 
of all races, cultures, and incomes with respect to the development, adoption, 
implementation, and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, and policies." CAL. 
GOV'T. CODE § 65040.12(e) (West 2003). 
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concerns into some aspects of the agency's enforcement program, grants 
program and public participation provisions. Closely following EPA's 
definition, the policy defines environmental justice as "the fair treatment 
and meaningful involvement of all people regardless of race, color, or 
income with respect to the development, implementation, and 
enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, and policies.,,22 A 
number of other states have adopted similar definitions in their 
environmental justice policies.23 
As is clear from the above, environmental justice norms have not only 
attracted Significant national attention, but they have also been 
recognized by policymakers in the form of legislative enactments, agency 
policies, and formal agency definitions. The next challenge is to translate 
these admittedly broad and aspirational principles into concrete agency 
actions. 
II. How ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE POSES CHALLENGES TO ENVIRONMENTAL 
DECISION MAKING 
In large measure, the traditional environmental regulatory scheme has 
ignored distributional issues.24 Rather, most environmental regulation 
has been premised on largely utilitarian principles of achieving the 
22 The policy provides that "fair treatment means that no group of people, including a 
racial, ethnic, or socioeconomic group, should bear a disproportionate share of the negative 
environmental consequences resulting from industrial, municipal, and commercial 
operations or the execution of federal, state, local, and tribal programs and policies." See 
N.Y. STATE DEP'T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, CP-29 ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND 
PERMlTIING (March 19, 2003), available at http://www.dec.state.ny.us/website/ej/ejpolicy 
.pdf (last visited Sept. 26, 2003). 
23 See, e.g., IJ'.TIIANA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT, ENVIRONMENTAL 
JUSTICE STRATEGIC PLAN (2001) (providing in its Vision Statement, "No citizens or 
communities of the State of Indiana, regardless of race, color, national origin, income, or 
geographic location, will bear a disproportionate share of the risk and consequences of 
environmental pollution or will be denied equal access to environmental benefits."); RHODE 
ISLAND DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT, DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY 
POLICY (Jan. 7, 2001) (providing "[flor purposes of this policy, environmental equity means 
that no person or particular group of persons suffers disproportionately from 
environmental degradation or intentional discrimination, or is denied enjoyment of a fair 
share of environmental improvements."), cited in Nicholas Targ, Three Paths to the 
Environmental Justice Goal: Social Capital, Going Beyond Meaningful Public Participation (on 
file with author). According to Targ, over the past decade thirty-five states have 
established authorities or undertaken initiatives of one kind or another to address 
environmental justice issues. Id. 
24 See, e.g., Eileen Gauna, The Environmental Justice Misfit: Public Participation and the 
Paradigm Paradox, 17 STAN. ENVfL. L.J. 3, 9-11 (1998); Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing 
"Environmental Justice": The Distributional Effects of Environmental Protection, 87 Nw. U. L. 
REV. 787, 792-96, 811-22 (1993). 
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greatest good for the greatest number in society. Environmental law has 
not been overtly concerned with whether the distribution of 
environmental harms is fair, whether there is an equitable match 
between individuals who bear the costs and those who reap the benefits, 
or whether it is unjust to impose incremental risks on populations 
already bearing disproportionate environmental and health risks (since 
few regulatory regimes mandate consideration of cumulative risk). 
For example, as Professor Eileen Gauna argues, the "interest 
representation" or "pluralism" model that characterizes most 
administrative decision making treats all the interests (preferences) of 
participating stakeholders as equal. Those advocating protection of the 
environment, or fairness in who bears the risks of a proposed action, are 
not entitled to any special consideration. The task of the agency 
regulator is to ascertain what the collectively expressed preferences of 
stakeholders are in what amounts to a surrogate legislative process.2S 
Moreover, important trends in environmental regulation have the 
potential to exacerbate environmental inequities. One is the growing 
popularity of market-based incentives, including tradeable emission 
credits, as a means to promote more cost-effective regulation. EPA, for 
instance, recently adopted a trading policy for water pollutant 
discharges.26 Tradeable credits also are the centerpiece of the Bush 
Administration's "Clear Skies" proposal for regulating power plant 
emissions.27 Few if any trading systems explicitly protect against the 
creation of hot spots, which, when they occur are likely to di~arately 
burden low-income communities and communities of color. Most 
problematic are the trading programs that allow trading between mobile 
and stationary sources of air pollution, and cross-pollutant trading. For 
example, Rule 1610, the so-called "car-scrapping program" in the South 
Coast Air Quality Management District, allowed stationary source 
polluters to avoid pollution-control equipment by purchasing pollution 
credits generated by destroying old, high-polluting cars. Experience 
with the program showed that while the stationary sources that 
purchased credits and avoided pollution controls were located in 
25 Gauna, The Environmental Justice Misfit, supra note 24 at 19-26. 
26 U.s. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FINAL WATER QUALITY TRADING POLICY Gan. 13,2003), 
available at http://www.epa.gov / owow / watershed / trading/ finalpolicy2003.htInl (last 
updated Apr. 4, 2003). 
27 See U.s. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CLEAR SKIES, available at 
http://www.epa.gov /clearskies/ (last updated Sept. 8,2003). 
28 See Stephen M. Johnson, Economics vs. Equity: Do Market-Based Environmental Reforms 
Exacerbate Environmental Injustice?, 56 WASH. & LEE 1. REv. 111, 129-131 (Winter 1999). 
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communities that were overwhelmingly people of color, the benefits 
from car scrapping were felt over the entire metropolitan Los Angeles 
region, which is only 36 percent people of color.29 
The current Administration, as well as critics of environmental 
regulation, also has been strongly pressing for greater reliance on cost-
benefit analysis.30 Virtually all cost-benefit analyses, however, examine 
net societal benefits and weigh them against net societal costs, without 
disaggregating which populations are experiencing the benefits and 
costS.31 Moreover, to "monetize" the benefits achieved by a proposed 
regulation, economists often use contingent valuation surveys, asking 
the affected population how much they would be willing to pay for 
environmental or health benefits. These surveys contain an inherent bias 
against poor communities and individuals who are likely to express less 
"willingness to pay" to avoid environmental harms, simply because they 
have fewer resources. A standard cost-benefit analysis, therefore, tends 
to justify imposing greater environmental burdens on poor communities 
than on their wealthier counterparts.32 
Similar issues arise with respect to the quantitative risk assessment 
and comparative risk assessment processes, on which cost-benefit 
analyses and many regulatory decisions are based. Quantitative risk 
29 Richard Toshiyuki Drury, et al., Pollution Trading and Environmental Injustice: Los 
Angeles' Failed Experiment in Air Quality Policy, 9 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'y F. 231, 251-55 
(Spring 1999). 
30 Cost-benefit analysis is mandated by only a few environmental statutes. See SIDNEY 
A. SHAPIRO & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, RISK REGULATION AT RIsK: RESTORING A PRAGMATIC 
APPROACH 40 (2003). However, Executive Order No. 12,866 requires federal agencies to 
prepare cost-benefit analyses for all "major" regulations (those with an annual economic 
impact of $100 million or more). Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (1993). The 
Bush Administration's Office of Management and Budget has stated that its policy is to 
"implement vigorously the principles and procedures" in the Executive Order. 
Memorandum from John D. Graham on Presidential Review of Agency Rulemaking by 
OIRA [Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs] (Sept. 20, 2001) available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov /omb / inforeg/ oira_review-process.htrnl (last visited Sept. 4, 
2003). 
31 LISA HEINZERLING AND FRANK ACKERMAN, PRICING THE PRICELESS: COST-BENEFIT 
ANALYSIS OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 23 (Georgetown Envtl. L. & pory Inst. 2002). 
As another scholar puts it: "Since a cost-benefit analysis of a toxic pollution problem 
typically does not support protecting all persons (because the marginal costs will be too 
high), cost-benefit analysis is incompatible with the goals of environmental justice. Cost-
benefit analysis and its philosophic ancestor, utilitarianism, compared with environmental 
justice are simply two different and incompatible views for addressing the problems of 
guiding exposures to toxic substances." Carl F. Cranor, Risk Assessment, Susceptible 
Subpopulations, and Environmental Justice, in THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 328 
(Michael Gerrard ed., 1999). 
32 HEINZERLING & ACKERMAN, supra note 31, at 23-24. 
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assessments attempt to quantify the probability of an adverse effect 
occurring because of exposure to a given hazard, for instance, the 
likelihood of residents developing cancer because they live adjacent to a 
benzene-emitting factory. Comparative risk assessments are used to 
rank environmental problems by their seriousness or relative risk. Risk 
assessments typically consider aggregate effects, such as total population 
risk, and downplay or fail to consider how these are distributed.33 
Additionally, as discussed below, risk assessments often fail to evaluate 
adequately the risks of especially vulnerable or highly exposed 
populations. Moreover, as Professor Sheila Foster notes, the risk-
assessment and subsequent risk-management processes often do not 
afford affected communities a meaningful role, despite the numerous 
subjective judgments and value choices inherent in the processes.34 
Having depicted in broad-brush strokes some of the inherent tensions 
between environmental justice principles and traditional environmental 
regulation, this Article next presents several concrete scenarios to 
illustrate how conflicts of this type may be resolved in a fairer and more 
ethical manner. 
III. How ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE NORMS CAN BE USED TO IMPROVE THE 
ETHICAL OUTCOMES OF AGENCY DECISION MAKING 
Disparities in environmental protection have occurred in a variety of 
regulatory contexts: the formulation of broad policy; the setting of 
environmental standards; permitting and land-use decisions; clean up of 
contaminated sites; and enforcement of environmental requirements. 
Thus, there are numerous ways in which environmental decision making 
33 Donald T. Hornstein, Reclaiming Environmental Law: A Normative Critique of 
Comparative Risk Analysis, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 562,592-604 (1992). 
34 See Sheila R. Foster, Meeting the Environmental Justice Challenge: Evolving Norms in 
Environmental Decisionmaking, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,992, 10,999 (2000). Among other things, 
comparative risk assessment focuses on the probability of risk occurring and does not 
consider the qualitative components of risk - social, psychological, moral, and emotional 
- that are important to how the public evaluates risk. In a related vein, Professor 
Catherine O'Neill has pointed out the growing tendency among environmental decision 
makers to rely on strategies of risk avoidance - in which those who bear risks are asked to 
change their behavior to avoid environmental harm rather than risk-reduction strategies 
that require risk producers to reduce harm. Examples include fish and wildlife 
consumption advisories warning anglers not to fish in contaminated waters; plant-
gathering restrictions; and air quality alerts. She notes that the burden of undertaking 
avoidance is likely to fall most heavily on communities of color, low-income communities, 
and indigenous peoples, who are disproportionately among the most exposed to 
environmental hazards. Catherine O'Neill, Risk Avoidance, Cultural Discrimination, and 
Environmental Justice for Indigenous Peoples, 30 ECOL. L. Q. 1,2-3 (2003). 
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can be changed to incorporate environmental justice principles. This 
section briefly discusses four specific examples. 
A. Reforming Standard Setting 
Standards are the foundation upon which many regulatory 
requirements rest. Many environmental standards are health-based, 
expressed by the ambient amount of a pollutant that is safe. Many 
health-based standards fail to adequately protect certain subpopulations, 
particularly those that are especially vulnerable to environmental harms 
or those who are more heavily exposed to pollutants than the average 
individual. 
One reason for this failure is the manner in which the risk assessments 
underlying many standards are carried out. Risk assessments generally 
utilize "a seventy-kilogram male with the general biology of a 
Caucasian, as a so-called reference man, in developing dose-response 
predictions and assume that this reference man is an apgropriate 
surrogate for minorities, as well as women and children." They 
typically fail to consider variability in the response of humans to 
different levels of pollution.36 Moreover, most risk assessments evaluate 
the risks of a single proposed activity (or exposure to a single chemical), 
without considering the total risks that persons face from cumulative 
exposures, or the s~ergistic risks from the interaction of multiple 
pollutant exposures.3 In addition, standards often are based on average 
exposure levels to a regulated substance, as opposed to the levels 
experienced by the most highly exposed populations. 
These limitations in the traditional standard-setting process are 
illustrated in the following three examples. 
1. Water Quality Standards 
Under the Clean Water Act, water quality standards are set by EPA 
and the states to protect water bodies for certain designated uses, 
J5 Robert R. Kuehn, The Environmental Justice Implications of Quantitative Risk 
Assessment, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 103, 12S (1996). 
36 As Professor Kuehn notes, "[t)here is a high degree of variability in the response of 
humans to different levels of pollution. Age, lifestyle, genetic background, sex, ethnicity, 
and race may all play an important role in enhancing the susceptibility of persons to 
environmentally related disease. Studies have shown human variability of more than 1000-
fold in drug metabolism and between 3- and ISO-fold in the carcinogenic metabolism of 
various chemicals." Id. at 122. 
'7 Id. at 117-18. 
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including swimming, recreation, and fish consumption. Traditionally, 
EPA assumed a fish consumption rate of 6.5 grams per day when setting 
water quality standards. This amount, based on market surveys of the 
general population conducted in the 1970s, presumed consumption of 
approximately one eight-ounce fish meal per month.38 
As Professor Catherine O'Neill has documented, Native Americans 
and other subpopulations consume far greater quantities of fish than the 
general population. Studies of fish consumption rates in the Pacific 
Northwest, for example, indicate that the mean consumption rate for 
Native Americans in these areas ranges from approximately 60 to 80 
grams per day; individuals at the 95th percentile of consumption eat 
approximately five times that amount, between 205 and 280 grams per 
day.39 Studies of other groups show similar rates, for instance 
documenting the 90th percentile fish consumption rate at 225 grams per 
day for urban fishers on Los Angeles Bay, 242 grams per day for Asian 
and Pacific Islander communities in Kings County, Washington, and 489 
grams per day for the Suquamish Indian Tribe.40 As a result, Native 
Americans and other subgroups can experience risks significantly 
greater than those faced by the general population from consuming 
contaminated fish, in some cases, cancer risks of 1 x 10-4 (or higher) as 
compared to 1 x 10-6 (or lower) for the general population. 41 Critics note 
that the problems resulting from underestimates of fish consumption 
have been compounded by the fact that EPA's water quality standards 
traditionally failed to take into account the actual level of bio-
accumulation of contaminants in fish.42 EPA has defended water quality 
standards resulting in these disparate levels of protection as providing a 
"lower yet adequate" protection for higher-consuming subpopulations, 
an argument upheld by the Ninth Circuit.43 
38 Catherine A. O'Neill, Variable Justice: Environmental Standards, Contaminated Fish, and 
"Acceptable" Risk to Native Peoples, 19 STAN. ENVTL. 1.J. 3,43-44 (2000) [hereinafter O'Neill, 
Variable Justice). 
39 Id. at 50-53. 
" NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE ADVISORY COUNCIL, FISH CONSUMPTION AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, A REPORT DEVELOPED FROM THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
JUSTICE ADVISORY COUNCIL MEETING OF DECEMBER 3-6, 2001, 27, available at 
http:// www.epa.gov / compliance / resources / publications / ej / fish_consump _report_II 02. 
pdf (last visited Sept. 24,2003) [hereinafter NEJAC). 
41 O'Neill, Variable Justice, supra note 38, at 55-57, 62-64. 
42 Barry E. Hill & Nicholas Targ, The Link Between Protecting Natural Resources and the 
Issue of Environmental Justice, 28 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. 1. REV. I, 11 (2000). 
43 Dioxin/Organochlorine Ctr. v. Clarke, 57 F.3d 1517, 1524 (9th Cir. 1995). 
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More recently, EPA has revised its methodology for setting water 
quality standards to incorporate a higher national default fish 
consumption rate of 17.5 grams per day for the general population and 
recreational fishers and 142.4 grams/day for subsistence fishers. 44 
However, many state water quality standards currently in effect are still 
4S based on the old 6.5 grams per day standard. Moreover, the new 
standard is still inadequate to protect higher-consuming subpopulations, 
even though, as a report by the National Environmental Justice Advisory 
Council noted, "consumption at these rates may reflect the very practices 
that these affected groups would want to see perpetuated and protected 
for cultural, traditional, religious, economic, and other reasons.,,46 
2. Farm Worker Entry Restrictions 
Under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide & Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 
EPA sets entry restrictions for farm workers, provisions that require a 
waiting period between pesticide application and worker reentry into 
the fields. As explained by Professor Gauna, in setting the reentry 
intervals, EPA assumed a default body weight appropriate for adults, 
154 pounds, unless there is potential harm to fetal development, in 
which case the default weight is 132 pounds, the average weight of 
women during childbearing years. The youngest legal farm workers, 
however, are only twelve years old, and have a median weight of only 
100 pounds.47 The default weight - and resulting standard - is even 
less appropriate for children younger than twelve, yet farm worker 
parents often take their preschool children (some of them infants) into 
the fields with them due to lack of day care services, a fact known to 
" Methodology for Deriving Ambient Water Quality Criteria for the Protection of Human 
Health (Oct. 2000), available at http://www.epa.gov /waterscience/humanhealth/ 
method/method.html (last visited Sept. 24,2003). 
45 NEJAC, supra note 40, at 34. 
46 Id. at 28. According to the NEJAC report, anglers consuming at the maximum rates 
documented in some communities - 1453.6 grams per day (Suquamish Indian Tribe); 
182.3 grams per day (Laotian communities in West Contra Costa County, California); 391.4 
grams per day (the Squaxin Island and Tulalip tribes); and 972 grams per day (four 
Columbia River tribes) - "would be grossly under protected by the new standard." Id. 
47 Eileen Gauna, Farmworkers as an Environmental Justice Issue: Similarities and 
Differences, 25 ENVIRONS ENVTL 1. & POL'y 67, 69 (2002), citing U.s. GEN. ACCOUNTING 
OFFICE, PESTICIDES, IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED TO ENSURE THE SAFETY OF FARMWORKERS AND 
THEIR CHILDREN, GAO/RCED-00-40, 19 (2000) [hereinafter GAO, PESTICIDES, 
IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED]. EPA justified the 154/132-pound basis for the reentry period by 
assuming that although twelve year olds were on average 100 pounds, their bodies have 
less surface area and they perform less work, resulting in less physical contact with 
pesticide-treated plants. Id. 
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EP A. 48 Children are especially vulnerable to environmental hazards 
because their systems are still developing, because they eat 
proportionately more food, drink more fluids, and breathe more air than 
adults, and because their behavior patterns, such as playing close to the 
ground and hand-to-mouth activity, increases their exposure to 
hazards.49 
The population affected by the entry standards is overwhelmingly 
minority. Ninety percent of the approximately two million hired farm 
workers in the United States are people of color.50 EPA estimated in 1999 
that there were 10,000 to 20,000 incidents of physician-diagnosed 
pesticide illnesses and injuries per ~ear in farm work, but acknowledges 
that this is a serious underestimate. 1 
3. Ambient Particulate Matter Standards in California 
A final example involves the California Air Resources Board's (ARB) 
recent effort to revise the state's ambient air standards for particulate 
emissions. This example is noteworthy because the ARB failed to 
recognize the distributional implications of its decision, despite having 
just adopted a comprehensive environmental justice strategy that calls 
for the agency to integrate environmental justice into all of its programs, 
policies, and regulations.52 
Under California law, ambient air quality standards must be set at 
levels that adequately protect the health of the ~ublic, including infants 
and children, with an adequate margin of safety. 3 The ARB's staff report 
.. [d . 
• 9 A recent EPA report concluded that children younger than two years face a 10-fold 
risk of developing cancer when exposed to certain toxic substances (mutagens, which cause 
cancer by damaging DNA), while children ages 2 to 15 have a risk three times that of adults 
from exposure to these substances. Jennifer Lee, Agency Says Children's Risk is Higher for 
Some Cancers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2003, at A19. 
50 The majority are Chicanos, followed by Puerto Ricans, Caribbean blacks, and 
African Americans. Ivette Perfecto & Baldemar Velasquez, Farm Workers: Among the Least 
Protected, 18 EPA J. 13,14 (Mar.! Apr. 1992). 
51 GAO, PESTICIDES, IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED, supra note 47, at 12. The GAO concluded 
that comprehensive information on the occurrence of acute and chronic health effects for 
farm workers due to pesticide exposure does not exist. [d. at 4. 
52 See CAL. AIR RES. BD., POLICIES AND ACTIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE (2001), 
available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/ch/programs/ej/ejpolicies.pdf (last updated May 5, 
2003). A report by the National Academy of Public Administration suggested that the 
ARB's policy may be the most comprehensive environmental justice plan in the country. 
See NATIONAL ACADEMY OF PuBLIC ADMINISTRATION, MODELS FOR CHANGE: EFFORTS BY 
FOUR STATES TO ADDRESS ENVIRONMENTAL JuSTICE 96 (2002). 
53 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 39606(d)(2) (West 2003). 
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on the proposed rule acknowledged that its proposed limits on PM 25 
(particulate matter 2.5 microns or less) would still result in close to 3000 
deaths and over 10,000 serious circulatory or respiratory illnesses each 
year. 54 The report also recognized that "some communities continue to 
experience higher exposures than others as a result of the cumulative 
impacts of air pollution from multiple mobile and stationary sources and 
thus may suffer a disproportionate level of adverse health effects.,,55 
Community groups urged the ARB to adopt a more protective standard, 
pointing out that the populations that will suffer disproportionately 
from the ongoing particulate exposures are low-income people and 
people of color, since they tend to live closer to factories, power plants, 
congested highways, and other sources of particulate emissions.56 
Indeed, there is clear evidence that in California, as elsewhere, peorle of 
color face higher than average exposure to harmful air pollutants.5 The 
ARB refused to set a stricter standard, and it dismissed the 
environmental justice concerns by contending that "[b]ecause ambient 
air quality standards simply define clean air, all of California's 
54 See CAL. AIR RES. BD., STAFF REPORT: PuBLIC HEARING TO CONSIDER AMENDMENTS 
TO THE AMBIENT AIR QUALITY STANDARDS FOR PARTICULATE MATTER AND SULFATES, at 9-21 
to 9-22 tbls.9.4-9.5 (May 3, 2002) available at http://www.arb.ca.gov /research/aaqs/std-
rs/pm-final/pm-fina1.htrn (last updated May 6, 2002) [hereinafter ARB STAFF REPORT]. 
55 Id. at 2-9. 
56 Comments of Golden Gate University Environmental Law & Justice Clinic et aI., to 
Cal. Air Resources Board, on Staff Report: Public Hearing to Consider Amendments to the 
Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate Matter and Sulfates 8,10 (June 18, 2002) (on 
file with author). 
57 For example, in 1990, the South Coast Air Quality Management District estimated 
that 71% of African Americans and 50% of Latinos reside in areas with the most polluted 
air, as contrasted with 34% of whites. ERIC MANN, L.A.'s LETHAL AIR: NEW STRATEGIES 
FOR POLICY, ORGANIZING, AND ACTION 31 (1991). In the Los Angeles area, the average 
cancer risk from air emissions is 35% greater for Latinos and 28% greater for Asian 
Americans and African Americans than for whites, after controlling for income and 
numerous other factors. Rachel Morello-Frosch, et aI., Environmental Justice and Southern 
California'S "Riskscape": The Distribution of Air Toxics Exposures and Health Risks Among 
Diverse Communities, 36 URBAN AFF. REV. 551, 565-70 (2001). In Los Angeles, moreover, 
minority school children, particularly Latinos, are more likely to be in public schools 
surrounded by heavily polluted air than other children (after controlling for other factors). 
Manuel Pastor, Jr., et aI., Who's Minding the Kids? Pollution, Public Schools and Environmental 
Justice in Los Angeles, 83 SOC. SCI. Q. 263, 264 (2002). The higher environmental risks faced 
by these children of color have been shown partially to contribute to their lower academic 
performance, even after controlling for factors such as percent of students on free lunches, 
teacher quality, percent of English learners, and other explanatory variables. Rachel 
Morello-Frosch, et aI., Integrating Environmental Justice and the Precautionary Principle in 
Research and Policy Making: The Case of Ambient Air Toxic Exposures and Health Risks Among 
Schoolchildren in Los Angeles, 584 ANNALS OF AMER. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 47, 52-57 (2002) 
[hereinafter Morello-Frosch, Integrating Environmental Justice and the Precautionary Principle]. 
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communities will benefit from the proposed health-based standards, as 
progress is made to attain the standards."s8 
When agencies set standards knowing that they will result in 
inadequate or lower protections for certain individuals or groups, the 
decisions raise fundamental questions about fair treatment. In essence, 
agencies are trading the health and safety of certain persons to lower 
overall costs for regulated entities and to promote the general welfare. 
As Professor Kristin Shrader-Frechette argues in her recent book on 
environmental justice, however, permitting activities that benefit society 
as a whole while imposing disparate environmental burdens on certain 
subgroups requires special justification, for instance, that the activity 
lead to greater long-term equality. 59 Otherwise, such discrimination 
amounts to treating certain individuals merely as means to the ends of 
others.60 
These concerns are magnified where the most highly exposed persons 
are not "anonymously" distributed throughout the general population, 
but are members of clearly identifiable subgroups, such as low-income 
populations, people of color, and Native Americans.61 These 
subpopulations, as compared to the general population, are worse off 
economically, have experienced and continue to experience 
discrimination in housing, employment, and other areas, suffer greater 
health problems, have less access to health care, and are exposed to 
higher levels of pollution. Moreover, in the case of Native Americans, 
insufficiently protective standards can threaten their cultural integrity, 
which, for example, may depend on fish and fish consumption. 62 
" ARB STAFF REPORT, supra note 54, at 2-9. 
" SHRADER-FRECHETTE, supra note 16, at 26-27. Moreover, the burden of establishing 
such justification should be on the party responsible for such differential burdens, since 
"[n]ot to put this burden on the possible discriminator would be to encourage power, 
rather than fairness, to determine treatment under the law." Id. at 27. 
60 [d. at 91. She notes that "all justifications for unequal treatment must be based on 
morally relevant considerations, if they are to be acceptable. If all humans have equal 
rights and equal dignity, then people ought to respect others' moral autonomy. Such 
respect means treating them as ends in themselves, and never merely as means to the ends 
of others." 
61 As Professor O'Neill notes, at this point agency decision makers are no longer 
"debating identity-less, anonymous, statistical lives." Rather, they are "deciding with full 
knowledge whom to protect. It involves nothing less than deciding, to paraphrase Annette 
Baier, which harms to notice and on whom we will with good conscience impose death, or 
risk of death." O'Neill, Variable Justice, supra note 38, at 74-75 (quoting Annette Baier, 
Poisoning the Wells, in VALUES AT RrsK49, 51 (Douglas MacLean ed., 1986)). 
62 Professor O'Neill explains that "[fjish, especially salmon, are necessary for the 
survival of the native peoples of the Pacific Northwest, both as individuals and as a people. 
O'Neill, Variable Justice, supra note 38, 5-6. Fish are crucial for native peoples' sustenance, 
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Many decisions about where to set environmental standards come 
down to questions of cost-effectiveness - what is the point at which the 
marginal costs to regulated entities of increased controls become too 
high to justify increased levels of protections? The ethical implications of 
approving standards with knowledge that they will disproportionately 
affect people of color or low-income communities have not been 
squarely on the table, but they need to be. In short, environmental 
justice principles must be directly incorporated into the standard-setting 
process. For example, regulators should add an extra margin of safety to 
water quality standards to ensure that poor communities of color and 
Native Americans are not subject to heightened health risks when they 
consume fish - rather than consigning these groups to a less protective 
level of safety than the general population. 
B. Incorporating the Precautionary Principle into Decision Making 
Over the past decade or so, the precautionary principle has emerged as 
an important framework for public policy. The precautionary principle 
has different formulations, but at its core provides that when an activity 
raises potential threats to the environment or human health, 
precautionary measures should be taken even if there is scientific 
uncertainty about those impacts. Important corollaries are that in such 
situations, the party responsible for creating the risk should bear the 
burden of proving that an action is safe and that a full range of 
alternatives to the potentially harmful activity must be examined.63 
Several ethical notions support the precautionary principle. First, it is 
fundamentally unfair to make the public bear the risks of uncertainty 
associated with toxic chemicals and other risk-producing activities. As 
Professor Robert Bullard has argued, the public, particularly heavily 
affected communities, often lacks the resources to hire the lawyers, 
expert witnesses, and doctors needed to prove harm. By contrast, 
businesses that introduce toxic chemicals into the environment benefit 
from their use, and are in the best position to prove their safety. Second, 
it violates principles of personal autonomy and informed consent for 
as a way to feed their family. Id. Fish are also crucial for subsistence, in the sense of a 
culture or way of life with economic, spiritual, social, and physical dimensions - a way to 
be Yakama, or to be Tulalip. Id. Salmon, especially, are central to the belief systems, 
identities, and social relationships that define these peoples. Id. 
63 See Wingspread Statement on the Precautionary Principle (Jan. 1998), cited in JOEL 
nCKNER ET AL., THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN ACTION: A HANDBOOK, Appendix, 
(Science and Environmental Health Network), available at http://www.sehn.org/rtfdocs 
/handbook-rtf.rtf. 
2003] Advancing Environmental Justice Norms 113 
people to be exposed to potentially harmful chemicals without being 
informed of their risks. Finally, precautionary action, taken to avoid 
unknown, long-term risks, is justified by the ethical obligations that 
current generations have to future generations.64 
The roots of the precautionary principle lie in international law and 
policy, where it has been integrated into a number of international 
conventions and agreements.65 Elements of the precautionary approach 
are also found to some degree in existing environmental statutes, i.e., the 
Clean Air Act's mandate that ambient air quality standards be set at a 
level requisite to protect the public health, allowing an "adequate margin 
of safety.,,66 The precautionary principle has been criticized, however, as 
a threat to technological progress,67 and as insufficiently determinate, 
and failing to provide meaningful guidance to regulators.68 It is beyond 
the scope of this article to delve into the larger debate about the 
precautionary principle and how its contours should be defined. 
Broadly speaking, however, greater reliance on the principle in 
environmental decision making is desirable because it will help advance 
the goals of the environmental justice movement, and hence improve the 
ethical outcomes of environmental decisions. 
64 As prominently articulated by Professor Edith Brown Weiss, intergenerational 
equity requires each generation to pass the planet on in no worse condition than it received 
it in and to provide equitable access to its resources and benefits. Edith Brown Weiss, Our 
Rights and Obligations to Future Generations for the Environment, 84 AM. J. INT'L. L. 198,200 
(1990). 
65 These include the Rio Declaration of the United Nations Conference on Environment 
and Development, the Bergen Declaration on Sustainable Development, the Maastricht 
Treaty on the European Union, the Barcelona Convention, the Cartagena Protocol to the 
Convention on Biodiversity, and the 1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change. 
neKNER, ET AL., supra note 63, at Appendix. 
66 42 U.s.c. § 7409(b) (2003). 
" See, e.g., John S. Applegate, The Taming of the Precautionary Principle, 27 WM. & MARY 
ENVTL. L. & POL'y REV. 13, 15 (2002) ("Within the United States, senior government officials 
and many prominent scholars vigorously oppose the precautionary principle, because they 
see it as a replacement for the risk-based, science-dominated, cost-sensitive regulatory 
structures that have come to characterize most of the world's sophisticated environmental 
regimes. These regulatory regimes proceed from the view that economic expansion and 
technological innovation are to be encouraged, because they increase overall social welfare, 
including improved human and environmental health. In this view, the precautionary 
principle offers an unwelcome and technically insupportable alternative.") 
68 Christopher D. Stone, Is There a Precautionary Principle?, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,790, 
10,792-99 (2001). Professor Stone argues that no single principle can encompass all of the 
concerns that motivate caution in the face of potentially risk-producing activities. Id. John 
Graham, Director of the Office of Information & Regulatory Affairs in the White House 
Office of Management and Budget, recently said of the precautionary principle: "We 
consider it to be a mythical concept, perhaps like a unicorn." Samuel Loewenberg, 
Precaution is for Europeans, NY nMES, May 18, 2003, at § 4,14. 
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At its core, the precautionary principle is designed to lead to overall 
reductions in risk-producing activities. Currently, poor people and 
people of color are exposed disproportionately to environmental 
hazards, including hazards whose long-term effects are unknown, or are 
otherwise of uncertain dimension. Minorities and the poor 
disproportionately bear the risks, for example, of exposure to pesticides, 
of childhood lead poisoning, of chronic exposure to air pollutants, and of 
exposure to a suite of toxic substances in the workplace. Reducing risky 
activities will benefit populations who are most likely to bear the brunt 
of environmental harms.69 
Consider, for example, the large gaps in our information about toxic 
substances. We have introduced into commerce thousands of chemical 
substances (EPA lists 75,000 chemicals in its Toxic Substances Control 
Act (TSCA) inventory as having some toxic effects), yet we know very 
little about the health effects of most of these chemicals.70 This is true 
even for the 3,000 so-called high production volume chemicals (HPV), 
those produced or imported in quantities of over one million pounds per 
year. EPA found in 1998 that for 93 percent of the HPV chemicals, some 
basic toxicity data necessary for a minimum understanding of a 
chemical's toxicity is lacking. There is no basic toxicity data for 43 
percent of HPV chemicals.71 Consider also the case of lead. Lead 
poisoning is widely regarded as the most serious environmental health 
hazard facing children today.72 Moreover, children from poor families 
are eight times more likely to be poisoned than those from higher income 
families, and African-American children are five times more likely to be 
poisoned than white children.73 Knowledge about the full extent of 
69 See generally, Morello-Frosch, Integrating Environmental Justice and the Precautionary 
Principle, supra note 57, at 48, 60-62 (noting important overlapping goals of environmental 
justice and precautionary principle and suggesting ways that two concepts could be better 
integrated to protect health of poor communities of color). 
70 ROBERT V. PERCNAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE AND 
POLICY 375 (3d ed. 2000). 
71 ENVT'L PROT. AGENCY, CHEMICAL HAZARD DATA AVAILABILITY STUDY (1998), 
available at http://www.epa.gov/oppt/chemtest/hazchem.htm (last visited Sept. 24, 2003). 
The chemical industry'S own study of 3,000 HPV chemicals found very similar gaps in 
basic toxicity information. See David Roe, Ready or Not: The Coming Wave of Toxic 
Chemicals, 29 ECOLOGY L.Q. 623, 627-28 (2002). 
72 Clifford Rechtschaffen, The Lead Poisoning Challenge: An Approach for California and 
Other States, 21 HARV. ENvrL. 1. REV. 387, 387 (1997) (citing LEAD-BASED PAINT HAZARD 
REDUCTION AND FINANCING TASK FORCE, PuTTING THE PIECES TOGETHER: CONTROLLING 
LEAD HAZARDS IN THE NATION'S HOUSING, REPORT OF THE LEAD-BASED PAINT HAZARD 
REDUCTION AND FINANCING TASK FORCE 2 (1995)) [hereinafter Rechtschaffen, Lead Poisoning 
Challenge]. 
73 46 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITYWKLY. REP. 141 (1997). 
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lead's toxicity, however, has only gradually emerged over an extended 
period. The recognized safe level of lead in the United States has been 
lowered dramatically over the last three decades, from blood-lead levels 
of 60 micrograms per deciliter of blood in the mid-1960s, to the current 
level of 10 micrograms per deciliter.74 Based on recent research, scientists 
now believe that even this standard is too high, and that exposure to 
levels below 10 micrograms can have a very significant impact on 
intellectual development.75 
Environmental justice advocates thus have embraced the 
precautionary principle as a means of reducing overall environmental 
risk, particularly avoidable risk. Mary O'Brien has argued that the 
assessment of alternatives mandated by following the precautionary 
principle will allow "people to see the potential in the concept that no 
risk is acceptable if there are better alternatives. This allows people to 
move toward the next logical step: that unnecessary risks and damages 
are unacceptable [and] indefensible.,,76 
What does incorporating the precautionary principle into decision 
making look like in practice? A few examples follow. 
The Los Angeles Unified School District adopted, in March of 1999, a 
policy requiring use of integrated pest management practices.77 The 
policy announces that implementation of the precautionary principle is 
the district's long-term objective. Noting that no pesticide product is free 
from risk or threat to human health, the policy states that "industrial 
producers should be required to prove that their pesticide products 
demonstrate an absence of the risks ... rather than requiring that the 
government or the public prove that human health is being harmed.,,78 
In the interim, the District will give non-chemical methods first 
consideration when selecting appropriate pest control techniques and 
will strive ultimately to eliminate the use of all chemical controls.79 
Another precautionary approach is exemplified by the Massachusetts 
Toxic Use Reduction Act, passed in 1989. The act requires companies to 
analyze their use of toxic chemicals and undergo a detailed planning 
74 Rechtschaffen, Lead Poisoning Challenge, supra note 72, at 391-92. 
75 Thomas H. Maugh, II, "Safe" Lead Levels Lower IQ in Children, Study Finds, L.A. DMES, 
Apr. 17,2003, at AI. 
76 MARY O'BRIEN, MAKING BEITER ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS: AN ALTERNATIVE TO 
RISK ASSESSMENT 213 (2000). 
77 See http://www.calisafe.org/policy.htm (last visited June 1, 2003). 
" Id. 
79 Id. 
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process aimed at identifying options for reducing chemical use.80 
Companies are required to measure their progress yearly and to make 
this information available to the public. Firms are not required to take 
any specific action; but from 1990 to 1995, companies in the state 
nonetheless dramatically reduced their toxic chemical emissions by more 
than two-thirds, their total chemical waste by 30 percent, and their total 
b 81 use y 20 percent. 
San Francisco's Environment Commission recently established a goal 
of having all city departments implement the precautionary principle. 
To implement this objective, in August 2003, the Board of Supervisors 
adopted a preferential purchasing ordinance. The measure requires the 
city to develop a list of products that have "lesser impacts" on human 
health and the environment compared to other, similar products, and to 
give preference to purchasing these products.82 
Another example is the European Union's recently adopted Chemicals 
Legislation.83 The legislation implements a mandatory registration and 
testing process for over 30,000 new and existing chemicals produced in 
significant quantities, in explicit recognition of the lack of knowledge 
about the dangers of many chemicals on the market. Among other 
things, producers will be required to provide information on the intrinsic 
properties and hazards of each substance; the use for which it is 
intended and potential exposure scenarios; resulting human health and 
environmental risks; and a statement on how the producer or user is 
managing the risks associated with the use of the substance.84 
Substances with certain hazardous characteristics, including those that 
are carcinogenic, mutagenic, cause reproductive effects, or are persistent 
organic pollutants, will require government approval prior to use.85 The 
policy consciously sets out to place a greater onus on industry to 
demonstrate the safety of their products.86 As the EU explains, under 
previous law, '"[t]he burden of proof' is on the authorities: they need to 
prove that a use of a chemical substance is unsafe before they may 
80 O'BRIEN, supra note 76, at 155-60. 
81 TICKNER, ET AL., supra note 63, at 6-7. 
82 See San Francisco, Cal., Precautionary Principle Ordinance (August 2003), available at 
http:// sfgov .orgl sfenvironment/ aboutus I policy Ilegislationl precaution_principle.htrn 
(last visited Sept. 24, 2003). 
83 Available at http://europa.eu.int/ cornml enterprise I chemicals I chempol 
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impose restrictions."s7 Under the new policy, "[t]he 'burden of proof' is 
on the industry. It has to be able to prove that the way it intends to use a 
chemical substance is safe. All actors in the supply chain will be obliged 
to assess and implement measures to ensure the safety of the chemical 
substances they handle."ss 
In this country, the onus remains on government agencies to prove 
that chemicals are unsafe before they can be regulated. The 
precautionary approach, however, could be employed to remedy our 
large data gap about toxic chemicals, by shifting the burden of proof to 
chemical producers to demonstrate the safety of toxic chemicals. For 
example, with respect to any HPV chemical for which we do not have a 
full suite of toxicity information, Congress could mandate that producers 
disclose the absence of such information, or, alternatively, that 
production decrease by a certain percentage annually until and unless 
this information is developed.89 
While many other applications of the precautionary principle are 
possible, the examples above illustrate how policies that consciously 
advance environmental justice principles can improve the ethical 
outcomes of environmental decision making. 
C. Reforming Land Use Decisions 
In part, the inequitable distribution of environmental hazards is the 
result of land use regulation and zoning practices, some historical, some 
ongoing.90 For example, as Professor Tony Arnold documented in a 
81 See http://europa.eu.int/ rapidl startl cgil guesten.ksh?p_action.gettxt=gt&doc= 
MEMO 103/99101 RAPID&lg=EN&display= (last visited Sept. 26,2003). 
88 Id. 
89 David Roe has suggested that the "legal privileges" enjoyed by chemicals sold in 
commerce could be progressively withdrawn if the chemicals lack basic toxicity 
information. Examples of progressive steps might include a requirement to be tested under 
TSCA; automatic reclassification as a "new" chemical under TSCA, thereby making it 
subject to stricter requirements than those applicable for existing chemicals; and automatic 
forfeiture of confidentiality claims related to a chemical. Roe has described these and 
similar ideas as "ignorance-based" controls - that is, the level of controls imposed on toxic 
substances increases when we are ignorant about their effects. Roe, supra note 71, at 639-41. 
90 These include racially restrictive covenants, urban renewal policies, exclusionary 
zoning, and "expulsive zoning." Expulsive zoning refers to instances in which local 
governments "downzoned" neighborhoods of color to allow incompatible, industrial uses. 
Yale Rabin, Expulsive Zoning: The Inequitable Legacy of Euclid, ill ZONING AND THE 
AMERICAN DREAM 101, 101-03, 106-18 (Charles M. Haar & Jerold S. Kayden eds., 1989). An 
example of how historic land use decisions have contributed to an inequitable distribution 
of environmental amenities is provided in Miller v. City of Dallas, 2002 WL 230834 (N.D. 
Tex. 2002). The plaintiffs in that case, residents of an African American community in 
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recent study of seven cities, low-income, high-minority neighborhoods 
are on the whole subject to more intensive zoning, allowing for 
industrial and commercial uses, than high-income, low-minority 
neighborhoods.91 Likewise, current siting processes typically do not 
account for inequities in income, education, political power, and social 
capital among communities, disparities that often lead companies to site 
noxious facilities in low-income communities or communities of color. 
As Luke Cole and Sheila Foster argue, since "[s]tate permitting laws 
remain neutral, or blind, toward these inequalities ... [they] perpetuate, 
and indeed exacerbate, distributional inequalities." 92 
While issues of distributive or social justice or fairness generally have 
not been criteria in land use regulation, they should be. This goal may 
be reached in a number of ways, a few of which are outlined below.93 
Several states have adopted so-called "anti-concentration" statutes, 
which place substantive or special procedural limits on the number of 
facilities that can be located in an area.94 In this vein, in 2001 California 
adopted legislation mandating that guidelines for general plans 
accomplish an equitable distribution of beneficial public services and 
avoid over-concentration of industrial facilities near schools and 
residences.95 California land use law requires cities and counties to 
Dallas, alleged unequal prOVISIOn of municipal services (flood protection, zoning, 
protection from industrial nuisances, landfill practices, and streets and drainage), based on 
the City of Dallas' long history of discriminatory zoning practices and their ongoing 
impacts (Le., in the 1940's the city adopted ordinances prohibiting whites and blacks from 
living together; its 1945 Master Plan concluded that because of flooding concerns there 
should be no residential development in the area, a finding that was ignored when the city 
later designated the area as a Negro subdivision). 
91 Craig Anthony Arnold, Planning Milagros: Environmental Justice and Land Use 
Regulation, 76 DENY. U. L. REV. 1,77-86 (1998). 
92 COLE & FOSTER, supra note 2, at 7l. 
93 As a theoretical matter, Professor Vicki Been has suggested various models of what 
fairness in Siting could look like: (1) even apportionment of LULUs among all 
neighborhoods; (2) compensation of communities hosting LULUs by other communities; 
(3) progressive siting - wealthier neighborhoods receive more LULUs; (4) all communities 
receive an equal number of vetoes that can be used to exclude a LULU; (5) cost 
internalization - those who benefit bear the cost; (6) the siting process involves no 
intentional discrimination; and (7) the siting process shows "equal concern and respect" for 
all neighborhoods. Vicki Been, What's Fairness Got to Do With It? Environmental Justice and 
the Siting of Locally Undesirable Land Uses, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1001, 1008 (1993). 
94 For example, in Arkansas, there is a presumption against the construction and 
operation of any high impact solid waste management facility within 12 miles of any 
existing similar facility. ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-6-1504 (Michie 2003). Alabama statutes 
prohibit more than one commercial hazardous waste treatment facility or disposal site 
within each county. ALA. CODE § 22-30-5.1 (2003). 
95 CAL. GOV'TCODE § 65040.12 (West 2003). 
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adopt a general plan guiding future development, composed of seven 
required elements (housing, transportation, open space, etc.). The State's 
draft guidelines provide that "[o]ver-concentration' occurs when 
industrial facilities or uses do not individually exceed acceptable 
regulatory standards for public health and safety, but when considered 
cumulatively with other industrial facilities and uses, pose a significant 
health and safety hazard to adjacent residential and school uses.,,96 They 
also state that cities and counties "should plan for the equitable 
distribution throughout the community of new public facilities and 
services that increase and enhance communi~ quality of life" including, 
parks, open space, and recreational facilities. 7 Prior to the adoption of 
this legislation, some local governments in California had already added 
"environmental equity" elements to their general plans. For instance, the 
City of Los Angeles General Plan establishes as a goal of its land use 
policies a "physically balanced distribution of land uses.,,98 
Likewise, New York City's "Fair Share Ordinance" requires that the 
selection of sites for city facilities "further the fair distribution among 
communities of the burdens and benefits associated with city facilities.,,99 
To implement the statute, New York City's Planning Commission 
adopted "Fair Share Criteria" that require city agencies to consider the 
distribution of similar facilities throughout the city, their compatibility 
with existing neighborhood conditions, and the effect of such facilities on 
96 CAL. OFFICE PLANNING & RESEARCH, GEN. PLAN GUIDELINES, PRELIMINARY DRAFT 
(2002), at 21, available at http://www.opr.ca.gov /planning/PDFs/GPG_2002.pdf (last 
visited Sept. 23, 2003). The Guidelines discuss the use of buffer zones or capping the 
number of facilities within a certain distance of each other as among the ways to avoid 
over-concentrating potentially hazardous facilities. Id. 
91 Id. at 20. This latter requirement is an important recognition of the fact that 
environmental amenities often have been distributed unfairly. Robert Garda, for example, 
has documented the marked disparities in access to parks and recreation in Los Angeles 
(which he notes has fewer acres of parks per 1,000 residents than any major city in the 
country). Garcia points out that "[i)n the inner city where low income communities of 
color live, there are .3 acres of parks per thousand residents, compared to 1.7 acres in 
disproportionately white and relatively wealthy parts of Los Angeles. The paucity of 
parkland is matched by the lack of recreational facilities. Within a five mile radius of [a) 
planned Baldwin Hills state park, for example, in the historical heart of African-American 
Los Angeles, there is one picnic table for every 10,000 people, one playground for 23,000 
children, one soccer field for 30,000 people and one basketball court for 36,000 people." 
Robert Garda, Building Community: Lessons from the Urban Parks Movement in Los Angeles 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author); see also Zenobia Lai, Andrew Leong & Chi 
Chi Wu, The Lessons of the Parcel C Struggle: Reflections on Community Lawyering, 6 UCLA 
ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 1,6-7 (Spring 2000) (noting that Boston's Chinatown has 0.6 acres of 
open space per 1,000 residents, least amount of open space per resident in city). 
98 CITY OF LOS ANGELES GENERAL PLAN ch. 3, goal 3A. 
99 N.Y. CITY CHARTER § 203 (as amended through Nov. 2002). 
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neighborhood character .100 
As Professor Foster has described, other state laws that seek to 
influence the distribution of unwanted facilities require that decision 
makers consider so called "soft criteria" - i.e., factors other than the 
technical design of a project or a quantitative assessment of its health 
risks - in permit decisions. 101 Soft-criteria considerations include the 
socioeconomic status of the host community, community perceptions, 
psychic costs, the potential for change in property values, and the 
cumulative health risks presented by other environmental sources in the 
h . 102 ost commuruty. 
These kinds of efforts to integrate environmental justice principles into 
land use decisions have the potential to make environmental law fairer 
and more ethical. 
D. Reforming Environmental Review Statutes 
Environmental review statutes such as the National Environmental 
Policy Act (NEPA) require federal agencies to analyze the effects of all 
federal projects that have a significant environmental impact. Sixteen 
states, plus the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico, have adopted 
similar statutes, known as state environmental policX acts (SEPAs), that 
govern projects approved by state or local agencies. I NEPA or its state 
analogues frequently will be implicated in permitting or other approval 
processes that raise environmental justice concerns. Traditionally, these 
statutes have not incorporated environmental justice principles, but they 
should be revised to do so, in a number of ways. A few of these are 
highlighted below. 
100 N.Y. CITY PLANNING COMM'N, CRITERIA FOR THE LocATION OF CITY FACILmES 10 
(Dec. 3, 1990). Michael Gerrard argues, however, that New York City's Fair Share program 
has had little demonstrable impact on the dispersion of unpopular facilities, and in only 
one reported case have plaintiffs prevailed in arguing that the siting of a facility violated 
the Fair Share criteria. Michael B. Gerrard, Environmental Justice and Local Land Use 
Decisionmaking, in TRENDS IN LAND USE LAW FROM A To Z, 135-136 (Patricia E. Salkin ed., 
2001). 
101 Sheila Foster, Impact Assessment, in THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: THEORIES 
AND PROCEDURES TO ADDRESS DISPROPORTIONATE RIsKS 287-289 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 
1999). Typically, however, there is no statutory guidance for the weight decision makers 
must give these factors in the permitting process. 
102 Id. 
103 RECHTSCHAFFEN & GAUNA, supra note 2, at 309. 
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1. Enhanced Public Participation 
One idea, much discussed in recent years, is to enhance public 
participation. NEP A requires agencies to provide for meaningful public 
involvement in the environmental review process.104 Environmental 
justice advocates have advanced many thoughtful suggestions for 
agencies to augment customary practices for public outreach (both in the 
NEPA process and in other agency processes). These include, among 
other ideas, soliciting public comments on environmental documents 
through community, social service or religious organizations, or through 
radio and television;l05 holding meetings at community-friendly times in 
accessible locations; translating key documents into the language spoken 
by the affected community;l06 establishing information repositories with 
documents about the proposed action; and providing technical 
assistance to interpret technical documents to help develop potential 
104 Agencies must seek public input at various points in the NEPA process, such as 
when determining the scope of what is to be included in an Environmental Impact 
Statement (EIS) ("scoping"), after issuing draft EISs, and after issuing final EISs but before 
final decisions have been made about the project. [d. at 310. Agencies also are required to 
hold public hearings when there is substantial controversy surrounding a project or 
substantial interest in a hearing. [d. They also are required to respond to all public 
comments submitted on draft EISs. [d. To facilitate public review, NEPA's regulations 
require that EISs must be written in "plain language ... so that decision makers and the 
public can readily understand them." 40 C.F.R. § 1502.8 (2003). See RECHTSCHAFFEN & 
GAUNA, supra note 2, at 310. 
Ire See J. Brooks Christo 1, Tennessee Makes Strides on Environmental Justice Despite Budget 
Shortfalls, Fall 2002 ECOStates 18, 18 (describing survey by Tennessee Dep't Environment & 
Conservation finding that residents had strongest preference for receiving environmental 
information by newspaper, radio or television) available at 
http://www.sso.org/ecos/publications/ECOStates.htm (last visited Sept. 19, 2003). 
106 One example in which a community was somewhat successful in arguing for 
translation of an environmental impact report is described in Lai, et aI., supra note 97, at 20-
21. In that case, residents of Boston's Chinatown opposed a proposed plan to construct a 
large parking garage for the New England Medical Center (NEMC) in their neighborhood. 
[d. at 11. The Medical Center prepared a draft report solely in English, but after protest by 
the community, translated a summary of the document into Chinese. [d. at 20. The 
Massachusetts Secretary of Environmental Affairs also required that NEMC translate 
"mearIingful" portions of any subsequent environmental reports. [d. at 21. In another 
important case, a community group in Kettleman City, California, challenged a hazardous 
waste facility under the state analogue to NEP A (the California Environmental Quality Act, 
or CEQA) because the county refused to translate the environmental review documents 
into Spanish. [d. The court ruled that translation of an extended summary of the 
[Environmental Impact Report], public meeting notices, and public hearing testimony were 
required because close to 40 percent of residents in the affected community were 
monolingual in Spanish; the residents' "mearIingful involvement in the CEQA review 
process was effectively precluded by the absence of the Spanish translation." El Pueblo 
para el Aire y Agua Limpio v. County of Kings, 22 ENVTL L. REP. 20,357 (Sup. Ct. 
Sacramento 1991). 
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alternatives and mitigation measures.107 A number of federal agencies 
have significantly enhanced their community outreach efforts and public 
participation programs along some of these suggested lines, both with 
respect to NEPA and other processes. lOS A number of states have done 
the same. For example, in 1999 Texas adopted legislation requiring that 
the state environmental agency provide public notice of a permit upon 
an application's completion, rather than when agency staff and the 
applicant have finished negotiating the draft permit (and when, as a 
practical matter, it is often too late for affected communities to obtain 
meaningful changes in the design of a project).l09 In the first year after 
the law took effect, the agency's public meetings increased from about 25 
to 89, and the agency received comments on more than 15 percent of 
total applications, rather than 10 percent in the prior year. l1O 
NEPA's requirement for meaningful public participation should also 
extend to whether the environmental review process is free from racial 
bias. Consider the example of Louisiana Energy Services' application to 
site a uranium enrichment plant in Homer, Louisiana, approved by the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).111 Community groups 
challenging the decision in an administrative appeal presented evidence 
that the NRC's review process was racially discriminatory, because at 
each successive stage, the communities under consideration for the 
project became poorer and more predominantly African American, 
107 See generally, COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: 
GUIDANCE UNDER THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT (1997), available at 
http://ceq.eh.doe.gov/nepa/regs/guidance.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2003); u.s. ENVT'L. 
PROT. AGENCY, FINAL GUIDANCE FOR INCORPORATING ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE CONCERNS 
IN EPA's NEPA COMPLIANCE ANALYSES (1998), available at http://www.epa.gov 
Iresources/policies/ej/ej--8Uidance_nepa_epa0498.pdf (last visited Sept. 23, 2003); 
NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE ADVISORY COUNCIL, NEJAC MODEL PuBLIC 
PARTICIPATION PLAN, available at http://www.epa.gov/projectxl/nejac.htm#back (last 
visited Sept. 23, 2003). See also CAL. PuB. RES. CODE § 71113(b)(5) (West 2003) (requiring 
Cal/EPA to recommend procedures to ensure that public documents, notices, and public 
hearings "are concise, understandable, and readily accessible to the public" and guidance 
for detennining when it is appropriate to translate crucial public documents, notices, and 
hearings for limited-English speaking populations). 
108 See Dennis Binder, et al., A Survey of Federal Agency Responses to President Clinton's 
Executive Order No. 12898 on Environmental Justice, 31 ENVTL L. REP. 11,133, 11,138-39 (2001) 
(describing overall community outreach and public participation efforts of federal agencies 
in response to Executive Order No. 12898 on Environmental Justice). 
109 See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN., § 382.056 (Vernon 2002). 
110 NAT'L ACADEMY OF PuB. ADMIN, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN EPA PERMITTING: 
REDUCING POLLUTION IN HIGH-RISK COMMUNITIES IS INTEGRAL TO THE AGENCY'S MISSION 38 
(2001). 
III In re Louisiana Energy Services, L.P., 1998 NRC LEXIS, at *10-*11 (1998). 
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culminating in the selection of a site that was 97 percent African 
American and extremely poor.112 Expert testimony introduced in the 
case also showed that the applicant's use of facially race-neutral siting 
criteria to screen out alternatives - such as eliminating sites close to 
sensitive receptors like hospitals, schools, and nursing homes -
disadvantaged poor and minority communities by reinforcing the impact 
of prior discrimination that had left them without such institutions.1l3 
The initial reviewing body found that this evidence raised a "reasonable 
inference that racial considerations played some part in the site selection 
process," and remanded the case for a more complete investigation.1l4 
Responding to the NRC's contention that its decision was based solely 
on technical and business criteria, and that there was no specific 
evidence that racial considerations motivated the decision, the reviewing 
board wrote that racial discrimination "cannot be uncovered with only a 
cursory review of the description of the [site selection process]. If it were 
so easily detected, racial discrimination would not be such a persistent 
and enduring problem in American society.,,115 On appeal, a panel of the 
NRC reversed this part of the board's order, holding that NEPA is not 
"a tool for addressing problems of racial discrimination.,,1l6 In the 
panel's view, NEPA is limited to evaluating objective impacts, rather 
than the subjective motives of the applicant or permitting agency.l17 
The appellate decision in In re Louisiana Energy Services reflects an 
unduly narrow view of NEP A, an act intended to place central 
importance on procedure and meaningful public involvement in agency 
decisions.1l8 For instance, how can federal decision makers "rigorously 
explore ... all reasonable alternatives," as NEPA's implementing 
guidelines require, if the selection of potential alternatives is infected 
with racial bias?1l9 Such bias clearly can impede a truly meaningful 
evaluation, by eliminating a host of potential alternatives from 
consideration, even where the subjective motives of the permitting 
agency are benign. Especially given NEPA's focus on process, 
112 See id. at *58. 
m See id. at *58-*60. 
114 In re Louisiana Energy Services, 1997 LEXIS, at *55 (1997). 
115 ld. at *54. 
116 See In re Louisiana Energy Services, 1998 NRC LEXIS, at *60. 
117 See id. at *62 (stating that Atomic Safety and Licensing Board's decision goes well 
beyond what NEPA has traditionally been interpreted to require). 
118 See, e.g., Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.s. 332, 351 (1989) 
(stating that NEP A merely prohibits uninformed, rather than unwise, agency action). 
119 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(a) (2003). 
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community groups should be able to require that an agency reconsider 
its evaluation of alternatives when evidence demonstrates that the 
agency's decision results from a racially biased process. 
2. A More Refined Environmental Analysis 
NEP A also should be interpreted to require agencies to prepare a more 
refined (distributional) environmental analysis of the impacts of 
proposed projects. Traditionally, agency environmental reviews have 
not looked at particular subpopulations burdened by a project, but 
rather analyzed the effects across the entire range of the affected public. 
The Council on Environmental Quality's (CEQ) Environmental Justice 
Guidance helpfully calls on agencies to determine whether an area 
affected by a proposed project may include low income, minority, or 
tribal populations, and whether the proposed action is likely to have a 
disproportionately high and adverse impact on these populations.12o 
Another part of the Louisiana Energy Services case discussed above 
provides an example of judicial application of this mandate. The 
reviewing board in that case overturned as inadequate the 
environmental review because the NRC did not take a more refined look 
at which subgroups in the affected area would be harmed, and which 
would be benefited, by the proposed uranium enrichment plant.121 
Specifically, the board found that the NRC had failed to examine the 
impact of a proposed road closure on the very low-income African-
American community that used the road as a pedestrian corridor. l22 The 
environmental analysis also failed to disaggregate the project's impact 
on property values. l23 While the analysis found that the project would 
generally have beneficial effects on local housing values, it did not 
examine the likely adverse impact on property values in the low-income 
African-American community directly adjacent to the plant.124 
This mandate to take a "more refined look" at affected subgroups is 
similar to the approach taken by EPA's Environmental Appeals Board in 
reviewing permitting decisions by EPA under other environmental 
statutes and the Executive Order on Environmental Justice. The Appeals 
Board has ruled that when there is a plausible claim presented that a 
120 See ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: GUIDANCE UNDER THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
POLICY ACT, supra note 107. 
121 In re Louisiana Energy Services, 1997 LEXIS, at *102-*03 (1997). 
122 [d. at *79. 
123 Id. at *88-*89. 
124 Id. 
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proposed facility will have disproportionate effects on low-income 
communities or communities of color, EPA should "take a more refined 
look" at a project's health and environmental impacts, focusing on 
smaller subpopulations, even if the facility does not pose a threat to a 
broad cross-section of the community.l25 
3. Cumulative Impact Analysis 
NEPA requires that agencies evaluate the cumulative impact of 
proposed projects. Cumulative impact, as defined by NEP A, is the sum 
of the incremental impact of a proposed action when added to other 
past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions. 126 NEP A's 
requirement of a cumulative impact analysis is especially important from 
an environmental justice perspective because almost no other pollution 
control statute requires it; indeed, the failure of other statutes to consider 
cumulative impacts is a major reason that, despite the protections 
afforded by individual laws, disproportionate burdens occur in low-
income communities and communities of color. NEPA's cumulative 
impacts requirement should be interpreted broadly by agencies to 
include consideration of the existing concentration of industrial facilities 
and other undesirable land uses in the affected neighborhood, 
background community health conditions and health risks, and other 
workplace and environmental exposures in the area. 
CONCLUSION 
Over the past decade, environmental justice has become a part of 
the legal lexicon. And environmental justice principles - with their 
compelling call for fairness in treatment and meaningful inclusion in 
public processes - increasingly are becoming part of the environmental 
decision-making fabric. As discussed in this Article, there are many 
ways in which this trend can and should be reinforced. As these 
principles become more central to environmental decision making, they 
hold the promise of making environmental law more ethical. 
125 See, e.g., In re Chemical Waste Management, Inc., 1995 EPA App. LEXIS 25, at '20 
(1995). See generally, Richard J. Lazarus & Stephanie Tai, Integrating Environmental Justice 
Into EPA Permitting Authority, 26 ECOL. L. Q. 617, 660-69 (1999). 
126 40 c.F.R. § 1508.7 (2003). 
